9 oct 2017
The leader of Hamas Movement, Hassan Yousef, said that Israeli Occupation Authorities (IOA) banned a delegation that represents Hamas in the West Bank from travelling to Egypt and participating in the Cairo reconciliation talks.
In a press statement on Monday, Yousef said that Cairo informed Hamas with the Israeli ban of travel on its West Bank members.
The Hamas leader in the West Bank told Quds Press that the travel ban order goes in line with the Israeli attempts aimed at foiling the Palestinian reconciliation.
He added that it will not affect the Cairo talks as Hamas delegation represents all of Hamas members in all regions, saying that they get in touch in every stage.
A delegation of Hamas Movement led by the Movement’s leader in Gaza Yahya al-Sinwar along with nine Hamas leaders left Gaza Strip earlier on Monday to Cairo in order to participate in the reconciliation meeting to be held in Cairo on Tuesday.
In a press statement on Monday, Yousef said that Cairo informed Hamas with the Israeli ban of travel on its West Bank members.
The Hamas leader in the West Bank told Quds Press that the travel ban order goes in line with the Israeli attempts aimed at foiling the Palestinian reconciliation.
He added that it will not affect the Cairo talks as Hamas delegation represents all of Hamas members in all regions, saying that they get in touch in every stage.
A delegation of Hamas Movement led by the Movement’s leader in Gaza Yahya al-Sinwar along with nine Hamas leaders left Gaza Strip earlier on Monday to Cairo in order to participate in the reconciliation meeting to be held in Cairo on Tuesday.
A group of Arab countries, headed by Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, have backtracked on their intention to present resolutions critical of Israel’s policies in east Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip at the UNESCO executive board session in Paris this week.
According to Haaretz newspaper, this would be the first time since April 2013 that resolutions were not presented on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
A senior Israeli official in the foreign ministry said the decision to withdraw the resolutions was made following quiet diplomatic talks last week between the UNESCO committee chairman, Michael Worbs, and the Israeli and Jordanian ambassadors at the organization.
The senior official said a number of Western countries were also involved in the talks, primarily the US, adding that US president Donald Trump’s adviser on Israel, Jason Greenblatt, was personally involved.
The understandings reached included a decision that, instead of holding a vote on two resolutions, on east Jerusalem and the status of occupied Palestine, which were submitted by Arab countries and whose wording was identical to that of resolutions passed six months ago, Worbs would submit two proposals to delay the vote by six months.
Worbs’s proposals are expected to be accepted by consensus by all 56 countries that are members of UNESCO’s executive board, according to the foreign ministry official, who also affirmed that Israel had not pledged anything in exchange.
The Israeli official added that, together with talks on postponing the vote, Israel had worked with ambassadors of the member states in Paris as well as in the capitals of the relevant countries to ensure that the group of countries voting against such anti-Israel resolutions would grow.
According to Haaretz newspaper, this would be the first time since April 2013 that resolutions were not presented on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
A senior Israeli official in the foreign ministry said the decision to withdraw the resolutions was made following quiet diplomatic talks last week between the UNESCO committee chairman, Michael Worbs, and the Israeli and Jordanian ambassadors at the organization.
The senior official said a number of Western countries were also involved in the talks, primarily the US, adding that US president Donald Trump’s adviser on Israel, Jason Greenblatt, was personally involved.
The understandings reached included a decision that, instead of holding a vote on two resolutions, on east Jerusalem and the status of occupied Palestine, which were submitted by Arab countries and whose wording was identical to that of resolutions passed six months ago, Worbs would submit two proposals to delay the vote by six months.
Worbs’s proposals are expected to be accepted by consensus by all 56 countries that are members of UNESCO’s executive board, according to the foreign ministry official, who also affirmed that Israel had not pledged anything in exchange.
The Israeli official added that, together with talks on postponing the vote, Israel had worked with ambassadors of the member states in Paris as well as in the capitals of the relevant countries to ensure that the group of countries voting against such anti-Israel resolutions would grow.
Israeli Internal Security Agency Shin Bet has the power to reject appointment or dismiss Arab teachers at Arab schools, Israeli Ynet News has reported.
According to Days of Palestine, a former official at the Israeli Ministry of Education, Emmanuel Koplovich, told Ynet News that Shin Bet has rejected the appointment of many qualified teachers.
“Shin Bet was involved in everything regarding recruitment for education positions,” confirmed the former head of the agency, Knesset member Yacob Berri. “It is still active in Arab schools to this day.”
The news website revealed that Shin Bet targeted the Arab teachers in cooperation with the ministry. Teachers did not know why they were dismissed or not accepted for a position.
It also revealed that some of the teachers were not involved in any political activities, but were rejected because of the political activities of one of their relatives.
According to the reports, information about Arab teachers and head teachers was circulated among different government institutions, mainly the education ministry and the Prime Minister’s office.
The Director of Adalah Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Hassan Jabareen, said that Shin Bet’s interference in the recruitment and dismissal of Arab teachers and head teachers has been known for a long time in the Arab community.
Such actions reiterates the hostility of the Israeli Education Ministry towards the country’s Arab citizens, who make up a fifth of the population.
“The Shin Bet has an important role,” insisted the former Director General of the Ministry of Education, Samson Shoshani. “Its mission is to make sure than no oppression is practiced against anyone.”
He added: “We are not against extremist teachers, but against extremist people in regard to loyalty to the state.”
According to Days of Palestine, a former official at the Israeli Ministry of Education, Emmanuel Koplovich, told Ynet News that Shin Bet has rejected the appointment of many qualified teachers.
“Shin Bet was involved in everything regarding recruitment for education positions,” confirmed the former head of the agency, Knesset member Yacob Berri. “It is still active in Arab schools to this day.”
The news website revealed that Shin Bet targeted the Arab teachers in cooperation with the ministry. Teachers did not know why they were dismissed or not accepted for a position.
It also revealed that some of the teachers were not involved in any political activities, but were rejected because of the political activities of one of their relatives.
According to the reports, information about Arab teachers and head teachers was circulated among different government institutions, mainly the education ministry and the Prime Minister’s office.
The Director of Adalah Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Hassan Jabareen, said that Shin Bet’s interference in the recruitment and dismissal of Arab teachers and head teachers has been known for a long time in the Arab community.
Such actions reiterates the hostility of the Israeli Education Ministry towards the country’s Arab citizens, who make up a fifth of the population.
“The Shin Bet has an important role,” insisted the former Director General of the Ministry of Education, Samson Shoshani. “Its mission is to make sure than no oppression is practiced against anyone.”
He added: “We are not against extremist teachers, but against extremist people in regard to loyalty to the state.”
8 oct 2017
The Washington-based Palestinian American Research Center (PARC) has given a Palestinian ex-detainee in Israeli jails the Award of Excellence for his academic research paper entitled “The Role of Settlers in Israel’s Political Decision-Making Process.”
The researcher, Ra’ed Khaled Ghabayen, received a symbolic financial award, $500, for his paper from the PARC, which gives awards for outstanding studies conducted by postgraduate students of Palestinian universities.
His paper, which is composed of five chapters, was supervised by Middle Eastern studies professor Osama Abu Nahel and professor Ahmed Dahlan, both working at al-Azhar University in Gaza.
Ghabayen, who spent about nine years in Israeli jails, expressed his happiness that his work was chosen by the center as the best academic research, dedicating his accomplishment to his friends in detention.
For his part, professor Abu Nahel described Ghabayen’s research paper as “very important,” saying it would contribute to enriching the Arab library with a serious issue.
The researcher, Ra’ed Khaled Ghabayen, received a symbolic financial award, $500, for his paper from the PARC, which gives awards for outstanding studies conducted by postgraduate students of Palestinian universities.
His paper, which is composed of five chapters, was supervised by Middle Eastern studies professor Osama Abu Nahel and professor Ahmed Dahlan, both working at al-Azhar University in Gaza.
Ghabayen, who spent about nine years in Israeli jails, expressed his happiness that his work was chosen by the center as the best academic research, dedicating his accomplishment to his friends in detention.
For his part, professor Abu Nahel described Ghabayen’s research paper as “very important,” saying it would contribute to enriching the Arab library with a serious issue.
6 oct 2017
Palestinians celebrate as the convoy of Rami Hamdallah, the Palestinian Authority prime minister, arrives through the Erez crossing into the Gaza Strip, 2 October.
Atia Darwish APA imagesYou sit around for ages, the old joke goes, waiting for a bus, and then three come along at the same time.
Something like this seems to be happening right now on the internal Palestinian political front. Until June, Palestinian politics seemed deadlocked, with no prospect of unity, no progress with Israel and no hope for Gaza. Then, two initiatives, both involving Hamas, and the latest promising a breakthrough on reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, came along right after each other.
For all the apparent optimism, however, fundamental obstacles remain, mitigating against a deal.
Hopes are raised
At the end of last year, polls showed widespread pessimism over chances for unity, partly because positions seemed so entrenched. Nothing that happened in the first half of 2017 dispelled this feeling.
In March, Hamas announced the creation of an administrative committee to govern Gaza, ignoring outrage from Ramallah where the West Bank Palestinian Authority said the move undermined unity efforts.
In April, Mahmoud Abbas, the PA leader and head of Fatah, seemed to sound the deathknell for those efforts. He reinstated taxes on fuel destined for Gaza, refused to pay Israel for electricity for the impoverished coastal strip, cut funding for medicines and health care there and slashed salaries for former civil servants, who had been paid to stay home after Hamas took control.
Two million Palestinians were left with just a few hours of electricity a day, threatening to bring forward a full-blown humanitarian catastrophe, long predicted.
Then, in June, Hamas suddenly announced a surprise agreement with Muhammad Dahlan, the erstwhile Gaza security chief, sworn enemy of Hamas and longstanding Abbas rival who was sacked from Fatah in 2011 amid corruption charges that were eventually dropped.
The agreement promised an end to Gaza’s isolation with an opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt and funding from the United Arab Emirates.
And just as suddenly, in September, Hamas announced that it was disbanding its administrative committee, would allow the PA to take on governance duties in Gaza, and would support presidential and parliamentary elections.
This week the PA cabinet held its first meeting in Gaza in three years and prime minister Rami Hamdallah was welcomed by large crowds.
Optimism that a potential breakthrough toward unity and reconciliation can be achieved seems higher than it has since the division between Hamas and Fatah descended into violence 10 years ago.
Weakness in common
There is a neat model that explains why buses tend to bunch (as it is apparently known in the transport industry). Politics, sadly, is messier, but several factors account for why intra-Palestinian politics – so stagnant so long – so suddenly entered a phase of hyperactivity.
The weakness of both Hamas and Fatah is a major factor.
In some ways, Hamas was caught in the perfect pincer movement. Heavily outgunned by Israel, three devastating assaults over 10 years took its toll in both lives and spirits. Gaza has been isolated from the world through a decade-old Israeli-Egyptian blockade, the economic consequences of which have been catastrophic.
Hamas then lost its most important sponsor when Gulf countries moved to ostracize Qatar, resulting in the relocation of Hamas leaders hitherto based there and the loss of an all-important source of revenue.
Abbas, meanwhile, has little to show for his decade-long pursuit of a dead-end peace process. Illegal colonies in occupied territory proliferate and Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, has been happy to assert that settlements “are here to stay forever.”
The PA did achieve a 2012 vote at the UN elevating Palestine to “non-member state” status, though this was a retreat from the original intention to secure full state status in 2011.
With the economy “near stagnation,” the deeply unpopular Abbas has grown increasingly autocratic. He has clamped down on dissent and deployed Palestinian security forces against his own population to stifle resistance to Israel’s occupation.
Both sides needed to escape their respective stalemates, with the humanitarian situation forcing more urgency on Hamas.
Regional interests
Hamas duly took the first step and established its administrative committee. Abbas retaliated with financial pressure, a high stakes gamble that saw him prepared to look like he was making common cause with Israel against Hamas.
Hamas then announced a new charter, defining itself as separate from the Muslim Brotherhood, a move specifically tailored to reach out to Egypt and Gulf states.
On the back of that came the agreement with Dahlan, which changed the dynamics, and clearly took Abbas by surprise. Not only was he now faced with the return of a rival he thought he might have gotten the better of last year at Fatah’s seventh general conference, he was now confronted by a Hamas with potential financial support from the UAE and rapidly warming relations with Egypt.
Cairo’s role is crucial. Fed up with a Sinai insurgency that shows little sign of abating, Egypt is trying to enlist Hamas’ help to ensure that Gaza does not become a haven for Sinai militants or a source of weapons. Hamas has proven amenable – while always rejecting accusations that it has supported Salafist militias which have claimed allegiance to the Islamic State group. Gaza’s Islamist rulers have clamped down on smuggling and began creating a buffer zone along the boundary with Egypt.
Egypt, meanwhile, has promised to ease the closure at Rafah, potentially allowing the crossing there not only to be open regularly but to be used for goods as well as people. That would be a hugely significant move and could finally bring some relief to the beleaguered economy in Gaza.
The UAE, meanwhile, unhappy that Abbas rebuffed Saudi, UAE and Egyptian-backed efforts to bring Dahlan – who resides in Dubai and is close to the country’s leadership – back in from the cold last year, promised to sweeten the deal by building a power station on the Egyptian side of Rafah and paying families compensation for their losses during the Hamas-Fatah fighting in 2007, as a way to heal old wounds.
The Dahlan agreement gave Hamas leverage in unity talks. No longer isolated, it negotiates with a potential fallback option. And by making the first move and disbanding the administrative committee, Hamas has sent the ball firmly into Abbas’ court.
Obstacles
So far, the reaction in Ramallah has not been promising. The convening of a cabinet meeting in Gaza was purely a symbolic step, and while warmly received on Gaza’s streets, it had no substance.
Much more ominously for any successful negotiations, was an interview Abbas gave to an Egyptian TV station in which he insisted that Hamas would have to surrender its weapons and allow West Bank-controlled PA security forces – with all that that entails in terms of security cooperation with Israel – full control over Gaza.
This is anathema to Hamas, which at most would accept an open-ended ceasefire, or hudna, but whose very raison d’etre as a “Palestinian national liberation movement and resistance group” is predicated on the internationally sanctioned right to resist occupation.
Abbas’ condition is dictated by the logic of a peace process that demands not only an end to armed resistance against Israel’s occupation as a precondition for negotiations, but that those under occupation police themselves to that effect.
Abbas is also wary of losing international sponsorship from the West, which considers Hamas a terrorist group. While there may be wriggle room here, depending on what role Hamas might play under any unity agreement, there is little.
Netanyahu has already made his position clear: Israel would accept no “fake reconciliation” and reiterated his demand that all parties to a peace process should first “recognize the State of Israel and, of course, the Jewish state.”
To overcome Israeli objections, Abbas needs Washington on board, and Washington will not accept anything less than that demanded by Israel from a unity agreement. For all the talk in the White House of brokering the “ultimate deal,” nothing the Trump administration has said or done so far has veered significantly or even slightly from Washington’s pro-Israel orthodoxy.
Waiting for the bus
Abbas could decide to prioritize Palestinian needs over conditions imposed from abroad. A unified Palestinian front, for all the despondency opinion polls have revealed around the issue, is still a priority that can bring cheering crowds to the streets of Gaza.
But Abbas, 82, is eyeing what may well be his last attempt at a negotiated settlement. As such, another stalemate looms.
This time, Hamas may just be calculating that it has an out in the form of the agreement with Dahlan and that, having taken the first steps, failure to reconcile will be blamed squarely on Abbas.
It is a gamble: Hamas needs the closure on Gaza to ease. It needs Egypt to ensure this, and, reconciliation failing, it needs Cairo to agree to do so absent the cover of Abbas’ PA. But Cairo has distinct interests that might favor a deal with Hamas.
The advantage of bunching buses is that if the first one is full, a second one, with plenty of space, will be right behind. If Abbas, and behind him Washington, puts up too many conditions, Hamas can hold out for the Dahlan agreement, which posits less.
Omar Karmi is a former Jerusalem and Washington, DC, correspondent for The National newspaper.
Atia Darwish APA imagesYou sit around for ages, the old joke goes, waiting for a bus, and then three come along at the same time.
Something like this seems to be happening right now on the internal Palestinian political front. Until June, Palestinian politics seemed deadlocked, with no prospect of unity, no progress with Israel and no hope for Gaza. Then, two initiatives, both involving Hamas, and the latest promising a breakthrough on reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, came along right after each other.
For all the apparent optimism, however, fundamental obstacles remain, mitigating against a deal.
Hopes are raised
At the end of last year, polls showed widespread pessimism over chances for unity, partly because positions seemed so entrenched. Nothing that happened in the first half of 2017 dispelled this feeling.
In March, Hamas announced the creation of an administrative committee to govern Gaza, ignoring outrage from Ramallah where the West Bank Palestinian Authority said the move undermined unity efforts.
In April, Mahmoud Abbas, the PA leader and head of Fatah, seemed to sound the deathknell for those efforts. He reinstated taxes on fuel destined for Gaza, refused to pay Israel for electricity for the impoverished coastal strip, cut funding for medicines and health care there and slashed salaries for former civil servants, who had been paid to stay home after Hamas took control.
Two million Palestinians were left with just a few hours of electricity a day, threatening to bring forward a full-blown humanitarian catastrophe, long predicted.
Then, in June, Hamas suddenly announced a surprise agreement with Muhammad Dahlan, the erstwhile Gaza security chief, sworn enemy of Hamas and longstanding Abbas rival who was sacked from Fatah in 2011 amid corruption charges that were eventually dropped.
The agreement promised an end to Gaza’s isolation with an opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt and funding from the United Arab Emirates.
And just as suddenly, in September, Hamas announced that it was disbanding its administrative committee, would allow the PA to take on governance duties in Gaza, and would support presidential and parliamentary elections.
This week the PA cabinet held its first meeting in Gaza in three years and prime minister Rami Hamdallah was welcomed by large crowds.
Optimism that a potential breakthrough toward unity and reconciliation can be achieved seems higher than it has since the division between Hamas and Fatah descended into violence 10 years ago.
Weakness in common
There is a neat model that explains why buses tend to bunch (as it is apparently known in the transport industry). Politics, sadly, is messier, but several factors account for why intra-Palestinian politics – so stagnant so long – so suddenly entered a phase of hyperactivity.
The weakness of both Hamas and Fatah is a major factor.
In some ways, Hamas was caught in the perfect pincer movement. Heavily outgunned by Israel, three devastating assaults over 10 years took its toll in both lives and spirits. Gaza has been isolated from the world through a decade-old Israeli-Egyptian blockade, the economic consequences of which have been catastrophic.
Hamas then lost its most important sponsor when Gulf countries moved to ostracize Qatar, resulting in the relocation of Hamas leaders hitherto based there and the loss of an all-important source of revenue.
Abbas, meanwhile, has little to show for his decade-long pursuit of a dead-end peace process. Illegal colonies in occupied territory proliferate and Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, has been happy to assert that settlements “are here to stay forever.”
The PA did achieve a 2012 vote at the UN elevating Palestine to “non-member state” status, though this was a retreat from the original intention to secure full state status in 2011.
With the economy “near stagnation,” the deeply unpopular Abbas has grown increasingly autocratic. He has clamped down on dissent and deployed Palestinian security forces against his own population to stifle resistance to Israel’s occupation.
Both sides needed to escape their respective stalemates, with the humanitarian situation forcing more urgency on Hamas.
Regional interests
Hamas duly took the first step and established its administrative committee. Abbas retaliated with financial pressure, a high stakes gamble that saw him prepared to look like he was making common cause with Israel against Hamas.
Hamas then announced a new charter, defining itself as separate from the Muslim Brotherhood, a move specifically tailored to reach out to Egypt and Gulf states.
On the back of that came the agreement with Dahlan, which changed the dynamics, and clearly took Abbas by surprise. Not only was he now faced with the return of a rival he thought he might have gotten the better of last year at Fatah’s seventh general conference, he was now confronted by a Hamas with potential financial support from the UAE and rapidly warming relations with Egypt.
Cairo’s role is crucial. Fed up with a Sinai insurgency that shows little sign of abating, Egypt is trying to enlist Hamas’ help to ensure that Gaza does not become a haven for Sinai militants or a source of weapons. Hamas has proven amenable – while always rejecting accusations that it has supported Salafist militias which have claimed allegiance to the Islamic State group. Gaza’s Islamist rulers have clamped down on smuggling and began creating a buffer zone along the boundary with Egypt.
Egypt, meanwhile, has promised to ease the closure at Rafah, potentially allowing the crossing there not only to be open regularly but to be used for goods as well as people. That would be a hugely significant move and could finally bring some relief to the beleaguered economy in Gaza.
The UAE, meanwhile, unhappy that Abbas rebuffed Saudi, UAE and Egyptian-backed efforts to bring Dahlan – who resides in Dubai and is close to the country’s leadership – back in from the cold last year, promised to sweeten the deal by building a power station on the Egyptian side of Rafah and paying families compensation for their losses during the Hamas-Fatah fighting in 2007, as a way to heal old wounds.
The Dahlan agreement gave Hamas leverage in unity talks. No longer isolated, it negotiates with a potential fallback option. And by making the first move and disbanding the administrative committee, Hamas has sent the ball firmly into Abbas’ court.
Obstacles
So far, the reaction in Ramallah has not been promising. The convening of a cabinet meeting in Gaza was purely a symbolic step, and while warmly received on Gaza’s streets, it had no substance.
Much more ominously for any successful negotiations, was an interview Abbas gave to an Egyptian TV station in which he insisted that Hamas would have to surrender its weapons and allow West Bank-controlled PA security forces – with all that that entails in terms of security cooperation with Israel – full control over Gaza.
This is anathema to Hamas, which at most would accept an open-ended ceasefire, or hudna, but whose very raison d’etre as a “Palestinian national liberation movement and resistance group” is predicated on the internationally sanctioned right to resist occupation.
Abbas’ condition is dictated by the logic of a peace process that demands not only an end to armed resistance against Israel’s occupation as a precondition for negotiations, but that those under occupation police themselves to that effect.
Abbas is also wary of losing international sponsorship from the West, which considers Hamas a terrorist group. While there may be wriggle room here, depending on what role Hamas might play under any unity agreement, there is little.
Netanyahu has already made his position clear: Israel would accept no “fake reconciliation” and reiterated his demand that all parties to a peace process should first “recognize the State of Israel and, of course, the Jewish state.”
To overcome Israeli objections, Abbas needs Washington on board, and Washington will not accept anything less than that demanded by Israel from a unity agreement. For all the talk in the White House of brokering the “ultimate deal,” nothing the Trump administration has said or done so far has veered significantly or even slightly from Washington’s pro-Israel orthodoxy.
Waiting for the bus
Abbas could decide to prioritize Palestinian needs over conditions imposed from abroad. A unified Palestinian front, for all the despondency opinion polls have revealed around the issue, is still a priority that can bring cheering crowds to the streets of Gaza.
But Abbas, 82, is eyeing what may well be his last attempt at a negotiated settlement. As such, another stalemate looms.
This time, Hamas may just be calculating that it has an out in the form of the agreement with Dahlan and that, having taken the first steps, failure to reconcile will be blamed squarely on Abbas.
It is a gamble: Hamas needs the closure on Gaza to ease. It needs Egypt to ensure this, and, reconciliation failing, it needs Cairo to agree to do so absent the cover of Abbas’ PA. But Cairo has distinct interests that might favor a deal with Hamas.
The advantage of bunching buses is that if the first one is full, a second one, with plenty of space, will be right behind. If Abbas, and behind him Washington, puts up too many conditions, Hamas can hold out for the Dahlan agreement, which posits less.
Omar Karmi is a former Jerusalem and Washington, DC, correspondent for The National newspaper.
Hamas has officially declared that the Gaza Strip is under the administration of Palestinian Unity Government. They said, on Thursday, that it would work to support the national reconciliation government and strengthen its role to carry out its tasks.
Hamas spokesman, Abdul Latif al-Qanoua, said in a press statement that Hamas will put the interest of the entire Palestinian people above any interest or advantage for either of the political parties in the negotiations in Cairo as it will deal with a positive and complete flexibility to make it a success.
According to the PNN, he pointed out that Hamas is committed to the previous agreements with the Fateh movement, and is ready to begin implementation according to the Cairo Accord in 2011.
On the other side, Secretary General of the Central Committee of Fateh, Jibril Rjoub, said that the Committee is scheduled to hold a meeting in Ramallah, at midday Thursday, to discuss the latest political developments in Palestine, particularly regarding the reconciliation process.
He said that the meeting will be chaired by President Mahmoud Abbas as they will discuss the national reconciliation file in addition to Fateh affairs.
Fateh is expected to send a senior delegation to Cairo on Tuesday for meetings with Hamas to discuss important issues on the reconciliation agenda including security in Gaza, employees and Hamas weapons.
Hamas spokesman, Abdul Latif al-Qanoua, said in a press statement that Hamas will put the interest of the entire Palestinian people above any interest or advantage for either of the political parties in the negotiations in Cairo as it will deal with a positive and complete flexibility to make it a success.
According to the PNN, he pointed out that Hamas is committed to the previous agreements with the Fateh movement, and is ready to begin implementation according to the Cairo Accord in 2011.
On the other side, Secretary General of the Central Committee of Fateh, Jibril Rjoub, said that the Committee is scheduled to hold a meeting in Ramallah, at midday Thursday, to discuss the latest political developments in Palestine, particularly regarding the reconciliation process.
He said that the meeting will be chaired by President Mahmoud Abbas as they will discuss the national reconciliation file in addition to Fateh affairs.
Fateh is expected to send a senior delegation to Cairo on Tuesday for meetings with Hamas to discuss important issues on the reconciliation agenda including security in Gaza, employees and Hamas weapons.
5 oct 2017
Last month, members of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with Palestine (DPAL) called upon the EU to suspend its association agreement with Israel after visiting the occupied West Bank and witnessing the human rights violations inflicted upon Palestinians. One minor yet influential departure from the usual generic statements is the delegation’s experience of a sliver of the colonial violence meted out daily by Israel.
In their statement, published by the Wafa news agency, the delegation describes being “forced to take cover in a Palestinian shop as the Israeli army moved with lethal force against Palestinian residents using tear gas, stun grenades and live fire.” This episode occurred in Hebron, which the delegation described as “a microcosm of how the Israeli occupation manifests in practice, with a minority of settlers holding hostage a majority of Palestinians.”
The EU-Israel Association Agreement, which came into force in 2000, which the delegation has urged the EU to suspend, facilitates and prioritises Israel’s trade and research participation, subject to a clause which is routinely ignored. Article 2 of the Association Agreement states that: “Relations between the Parties, as well as the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this agreement.”
Obligations on both sides have been neglected. The refusal to suspend Israel’s participation is a reflection of the diplomacy at an international level which is prioritised over the protection of human rights. Israel has not honoured Article 2 of the agreement, while the EU has continued to turn a blind eye when it comes to the settler-colonial state’s violation of human rights and of its own stipulated clauses.
In their statement the MEPs have managed to impart the political and humanitarian impact of Israel’s violations upon the Palestinian people, particularly in their descriptions of forced displacement and settlement construction as “war crimes under international law”. The statement imparts an awareness of swift decline in the erasure of Palestine and Palestinians, however there is no departure from the two-state rhetoric which is the foundation upon which the EU has based its diplomacy with Israel and which continues to influence the institution’s reticence to define Israel’s colonial character.
The DPAL delegation stressed:
The two-state solution will only be achieved when Israel starts feeling the consequences for their illegal action.
While the statement is partly true as regards facing accountability, it is also important to note that the two-state compromise seeks to maintain the earlier colonisation efforts by providing a purported solution which absolves Israel of its 1948 crimes, in particular the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian population. Commitment to the two-state solution in the current scenario is also an affirmation of acquiescence with the concept of Israel as an inherently violent state.
Even if, hypothetically, the two-state scenario materialises, both DPAL and the EU should recognise that the imposition does not take into account the illegal means by which Israel came into existence and how this existence is the source of rupture when it comes to the Palestinian right of return. Hence, suspension of the agreement should be the first step in upholding accountability both ways – Israel should face accountability for its violations emanating from its existence while the EU’s introspection should include a thorough opposition to facilitating the colonial enterprise at the expense of the Palestinian population.
In their statement, published by the Wafa news agency, the delegation describes being “forced to take cover in a Palestinian shop as the Israeli army moved with lethal force against Palestinian residents using tear gas, stun grenades and live fire.” This episode occurred in Hebron, which the delegation described as “a microcosm of how the Israeli occupation manifests in practice, with a minority of settlers holding hostage a majority of Palestinians.”
The EU-Israel Association Agreement, which came into force in 2000, which the delegation has urged the EU to suspend, facilitates and prioritises Israel’s trade and research participation, subject to a clause which is routinely ignored. Article 2 of the Association Agreement states that: “Relations between the Parties, as well as the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this agreement.”
Obligations on both sides have been neglected. The refusal to suspend Israel’s participation is a reflection of the diplomacy at an international level which is prioritised over the protection of human rights. Israel has not honoured Article 2 of the agreement, while the EU has continued to turn a blind eye when it comes to the settler-colonial state’s violation of human rights and of its own stipulated clauses.
In their statement the MEPs have managed to impart the political and humanitarian impact of Israel’s violations upon the Palestinian people, particularly in their descriptions of forced displacement and settlement construction as “war crimes under international law”. The statement imparts an awareness of swift decline in the erasure of Palestine and Palestinians, however there is no departure from the two-state rhetoric which is the foundation upon which the EU has based its diplomacy with Israel and which continues to influence the institution’s reticence to define Israel’s colonial character.
The DPAL delegation stressed:
The two-state solution will only be achieved when Israel starts feeling the consequences for their illegal action.
While the statement is partly true as regards facing accountability, it is also important to note that the two-state compromise seeks to maintain the earlier colonisation efforts by providing a purported solution which absolves Israel of its 1948 crimes, in particular the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian population. Commitment to the two-state solution in the current scenario is also an affirmation of acquiescence with the concept of Israel as an inherently violent state.
Even if, hypothetically, the two-state scenario materialises, both DPAL and the EU should recognise that the imposition does not take into account the illegal means by which Israel came into existence and how this existence is the source of rupture when it comes to the Palestinian right of return. Hence, suspension of the agreement should be the first step in upholding accountability both ways – Israel should face accountability for its violations emanating from its existence while the EU’s introspection should include a thorough opposition to facilitating the colonial enterprise at the expense of the Palestinian population.
Hamas Movement strongly condemned a call made by a committee of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) urging Palestinian women to participate in a normalization march with Israeli counterparts southeast of Jericho next week.
Hamas’s spokesman Abdullatif al-Qanoa said, in a press statement on Thursday, that the so-called PLO Committee for Communication with Israeli Society’s call for a Palestinian-Israeli march runs contrary to the national consensus and humiliates the history, present and future of the Palestinian people.
Qanoa expressed his Movement’s refusal of such an event and called on the Palestinian women not to participate as it aims at normalizing relations with the Israeli occupation which is refused by all sectors of the Palestinian people.
Hamas’s spokesman Abdullatif al-Qanoa said, in a press statement on Thursday, that the so-called PLO Committee for Communication with Israeli Society’s call for a Palestinian-Israeli march runs contrary to the national consensus and humiliates the history, present and future of the Palestinian people.
Qanoa expressed his Movement’s refusal of such an event and called on the Palestinian women not to participate as it aims at normalizing relations with the Israeli occupation which is refused by all sectors of the Palestinian people.
The Palestinian Mine Action Center demined Deir Abu Daif field east of Jenin in the northern West Bank. The field area was estimated at 22.5 dunums.
In a statement on Thursday, the center said that the demining process lasted for four months as different types of mines were removed.
The project was implemented by cooperation with the HALO Trust British demining company.
Different locations in the West Bank especially in the Jordan Valley still contain old mines dating back to 1967, which constitute a real risk to the lives of people residing in these areas on one hand and prevent them from investing their lands on the other hand.
In a statement on Thursday, the center said that the demining process lasted for four months as different types of mines were removed.
The project was implemented by cooperation with the HALO Trust British demining company.
Different locations in the West Bank especially in the Jordan Valley still contain old mines dating back to 1967, which constitute a real risk to the lives of people residing in these areas on one hand and prevent them from investing their lands on the other hand.