30 june 2015
Three of the victims of Arab sector violence over the past week
After four people murdered over the past week in violent incidents in the Arab sector, Israeli Arabs are frustrated at what they perceive as lack of interest from authorities.
"Arab MKs are dealing with Gaza and other things. It would appear they don't care about what happens in the sector," an angry resident of Tamra said Tuesday after a fourth person fell victim to violence in the Arab sector over the past week.
A 60-year-old Tamra resident was shot to death on Tuesday night after unknown perpetrators on a motorcycle opened fire on a supermarket in the city. Three innocent passersby, including the one who was killed, were wounded in the incident. On Sunday, a 33-year-old man was stabbed to death in a fight between relatives in the Arraba local council in the Galilee. Six were arrested on suspicion of involvement in the murder.
Last week, a 42-year-old teacher from the Druze village of Beit Jann was murdered. Her body was discovered with signs of severe violence. Her husband, a Border Police officer, and her son were arrested. Three days before that, a 49-year-old resident of Tayibe was killed from a stray bullet fired near his house. The latest case in Tamra has raised concerns among Arab residents who feel that their lives are in danger in light of the recent increase in violence and crime in the sector.
Following the murder in Tamra, Mayor Suhel Diab announced a general strike and demanded an answer from authorities on how to deal with the mounting violence. "Unfortunately, the Arab sector is bleeding," Diab said. "It's time to join hands. Every mother and father who know of a relative that owns a gun are asked to inform the police before other people are hurt. We need full cooperation between the police and the residents."
The mayor called on the police to send massive forces into Arab communities. "We need to install more security camera. It can't be that in Karmiel and Acre hundreds of cameras were installed and we have to settle for only nine cameras." Despite the recent murders, there has been no condemnation from Arab MKs.
An official from the Joint Arab List told Ynet in response, "We view these violent incidents very seriously and make an effort all the time to deal with this phenomenon. MK Ahmed Tibi held a sulha (reconciliation ceremony) at his house between families that had a blood feud."
The Tamra victim was a Meretz activist. MK Esawi Freige's office said that "The uncontrollable violence in the Arab society has once again claimed a life, a precious life of a wonderful man, a representative of the public. Today is the time for sadness and remembrance, but it is our duty to understand that we must fight this destructive violence, fight against it from within using education and authority and fight from without using a police force that doesn't run away and ignore, but handles it."
After four people murdered over the past week in violent incidents in the Arab sector, Israeli Arabs are frustrated at what they perceive as lack of interest from authorities.
"Arab MKs are dealing with Gaza and other things. It would appear they don't care about what happens in the sector," an angry resident of Tamra said Tuesday after a fourth person fell victim to violence in the Arab sector over the past week.
A 60-year-old Tamra resident was shot to death on Tuesday night after unknown perpetrators on a motorcycle opened fire on a supermarket in the city. Three innocent passersby, including the one who was killed, were wounded in the incident. On Sunday, a 33-year-old man was stabbed to death in a fight between relatives in the Arraba local council in the Galilee. Six were arrested on suspicion of involvement in the murder.
Last week, a 42-year-old teacher from the Druze village of Beit Jann was murdered. Her body was discovered with signs of severe violence. Her husband, a Border Police officer, and her son were arrested. Three days before that, a 49-year-old resident of Tayibe was killed from a stray bullet fired near his house. The latest case in Tamra has raised concerns among Arab residents who feel that their lives are in danger in light of the recent increase in violence and crime in the sector.
Following the murder in Tamra, Mayor Suhel Diab announced a general strike and demanded an answer from authorities on how to deal with the mounting violence. "Unfortunately, the Arab sector is bleeding," Diab said. "It's time to join hands. Every mother and father who know of a relative that owns a gun are asked to inform the police before other people are hurt. We need full cooperation between the police and the residents."
The mayor called on the police to send massive forces into Arab communities. "We need to install more security camera. It can't be that in Karmiel and Acre hundreds of cameras were installed and we have to settle for only nine cameras." Despite the recent murders, there has been no condemnation from Arab MKs.
An official from the Joint Arab List told Ynet in response, "We view these violent incidents very seriously and make an effort all the time to deal with this phenomenon. MK Ahmed Tibi held a sulha (reconciliation ceremony) at his house between families that had a blood feud."
The Tamra victim was a Meretz activist. MK Esawi Freige's office said that "The uncontrollable violence in the Arab society has once again claimed a life, a precious life of a wonderful man, a representative of the public. Today is the time for sadness and remembrance, but it is our duty to understand that we must fight this destructive violence, fight against it from within using education and authority and fight from without using a police force that doesn't run away and ignore, but handles it."
Israeli Defence Minister, Moshe Ya'alon
Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Ya'alon acknowledged on Monday that his government helps Syrian rebels fighting against the Assad regime on condition that they keep the Israel-Syria border secure. The protection of the Druze minority from immediate danger is also a condition for support, the Israeli media has reported. He made the disclosure to Israeli diplomatic correspondents in Tel Aviv.
"When someone wounded comes close to the border, you need to offer treatment for him," the minister was quoted by Al-Quds newspaper. He said that Israel sends messages through wounded Syrians that if they want Israeli assistance to continue, the rebels need to stick to its conditions.
According to Ya'alon, more than 1,000 Syrians have received medical assistance in Israeli hospitals since the start of the revolution in 2011. "Israel will continue to act with sensitivity regarding the Druze," Ya'alon said according to Times of Israel. "On the other hand, the rebels on the other side also feel that we're acting sensitively."
Last week, a crowd of Druze on the occupied Golan Heights attacked an Israeli ambulance carrying two Syrian rebels. One of them died and the other suffered critical injuries.
The Druze acted "irresponsibly" last week, said Ya'alon. "The person in the Israeli ambulance was not affiliated with Al-Nusra Front, and his death will provoke calls for revenge."
According to Israeli officials, around 110,000 Druze live in the north of Israel, with 20,000 on the occupied Golan Heights.
Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Ya'alon acknowledged on Monday that his government helps Syrian rebels fighting against the Assad regime on condition that they keep the Israel-Syria border secure. The protection of the Druze minority from immediate danger is also a condition for support, the Israeli media has reported. He made the disclosure to Israeli diplomatic correspondents in Tel Aviv.
"When someone wounded comes close to the border, you need to offer treatment for him," the minister was quoted by Al-Quds newspaper. He said that Israel sends messages through wounded Syrians that if they want Israeli assistance to continue, the rebels need to stick to its conditions.
According to Ya'alon, more than 1,000 Syrians have received medical assistance in Israeli hospitals since the start of the revolution in 2011. "Israel will continue to act with sensitivity regarding the Druze," Ya'alon said according to Times of Israel. "On the other hand, the rebels on the other side also feel that we're acting sensitively."
Last week, a crowd of Druze on the occupied Golan Heights attacked an Israeli ambulance carrying two Syrian rebels. One of them died and the other suffered critical injuries.
The Druze acted "irresponsibly" last week, said Ya'alon. "The person in the Israeli ambulance was not affiliated with Al-Nusra Front, and his death will provoke calls for revenge."
According to Israeli officials, around 110,000 Druze live in the north of Israel, with 20,000 on the occupied Golan Heights.
29 june 2015
Druze protest to protect Syrian brether
Defense minister says Israel knew there were rebels among those it was helping, and conditioned its help on terrorist groups not approaching the fence, and the safety of the Druze.
Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon said on Monday it had conditioned humanitarian aid to select Syrian rebel groups on its border - on them not harming the Druze minority in the country's civil war.
The Druze in Syria have long been loyal to President Bashar Assad, and their brethren in Israel and the Golan Heights; who have been lobbying the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to safeguard the community.
The government, however, has sought to keep out of the more than four-year-old insurgency against Assad, an old foe who, they fear; may be toppled by more hostile Islamist militants.
But in a rare spillover of Syria's sectarian conflict into the Golan, a Druze mob last week beat to death a civil war casualty who was being taken by ambulance to Israel, where hundreds of Syrian wounded have received treatment during the conflict.
Israel has said it has also sent food and water across the frontier.
Briefing reporters on Monday, Ya'alon said that, from the outset, Israel knew there were rebels among those it was helping and; "placed two conditions on this aid - that terrorist groups not approach the fence, and that the Druze not be touched".
He was referring to the southern Syrian Druze village of Hader on which rebels have encroached, setting off solidarity protests in the Golan where the Druze are an Arab minority with influence in the military and government.
Another Israeli defense official said that while Israel has not refused medical treatment to any Syrian approaching its lines; "later, when it became clear that they were rebels, we made sure that they understood we expected our conditions to be kept".
The official said he knew of no cases of Israel helping members of Nusra Front, an al Qaeda offshoot in Syria which has beset the Druze. Rather, the official said, Israel has engaged mainly with non-jihadist rebels like the Free Syrian Army.
The "terrorists" referred to by Ya'alon were radical Islamists that are bent on attacking Israel no less than on toppling Assad, the Israeli official told Reuters.
But he allowed that telling them apart from other armed factions "can be difficult".
Ya'alon said Israel's conditions were being upheld, but that the June 22 Druze attack on the ambulance that left one Syrian casualty dead and another seriously wounded may have backfired by "spurring calls for revenge against the Druze in Hader".
Defense minister says Israel knew there were rebels among those it was helping, and conditioned its help on terrorist groups not approaching the fence, and the safety of the Druze.
Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon said on Monday it had conditioned humanitarian aid to select Syrian rebel groups on its border - on them not harming the Druze minority in the country's civil war.
The Druze in Syria have long been loyal to President Bashar Assad, and their brethren in Israel and the Golan Heights; who have been lobbying the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to safeguard the community.
The government, however, has sought to keep out of the more than four-year-old insurgency against Assad, an old foe who, they fear; may be toppled by more hostile Islamist militants.
But in a rare spillover of Syria's sectarian conflict into the Golan, a Druze mob last week beat to death a civil war casualty who was being taken by ambulance to Israel, where hundreds of Syrian wounded have received treatment during the conflict.
Israel has said it has also sent food and water across the frontier.
Briefing reporters on Monday, Ya'alon said that, from the outset, Israel knew there were rebels among those it was helping and; "placed two conditions on this aid - that terrorist groups not approach the fence, and that the Druze not be touched".
He was referring to the southern Syrian Druze village of Hader on which rebels have encroached, setting off solidarity protests in the Golan where the Druze are an Arab minority with influence in the military and government.
Another Israeli defense official said that while Israel has not refused medical treatment to any Syrian approaching its lines; "later, when it became clear that they were rebels, we made sure that they understood we expected our conditions to be kept".
The official said he knew of no cases of Israel helping members of Nusra Front, an al Qaeda offshoot in Syria which has beset the Druze. Rather, the official said, Israel has engaged mainly with non-jihadist rebels like the Free Syrian Army.
The "terrorists" referred to by Ya'alon were radical Islamists that are bent on attacking Israel no less than on toppling Assad, the Israeli official told Reuters.
But he allowed that telling them apart from other armed factions "can be difficult".
Ya'alon said Israel's conditions were being upheld, but that the June 22 Druze attack on the ambulance that left one Syrian casualty dead and another seriously wounded may have backfired by "spurring calls for revenge against the Druze in Hader".
27 june 2015
Sharon with housing plans for settlers to be evacuated from Gaza, July 2005
A year before the evacuation, the Southern Command warned of 'Hamastan in Gaza,' but Army Intelligence was quick to dismiss it, while the Shin Bet estimated Hamas was interested in calm; those who did try to alert of the dangers of leaving Gaza were pushed aside, while the rest toed the line.
The first time the GOC Southern Command, Dan Harel, heard about the plan to evacuate Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip was on the radio, while driving his car. This was in December 2003. He was listening to prime minister Ariel Sharon's speech at the Herzliya Conference when he suddenly realized that a dramatic decision has been made in secret and without his knowledge, and that one of the most meaningful events the Israeli society and the IDF will ever experience was going to happen under his command.
The research division at Army Intelligence, which was supposed to provide the intelligence for the Gaza disengagement, was also unaware of what was happening in the prime minister's close circle. It is not unreasonable to assume that the prime minister and defense minister would be interested in hearing the opinion of Army Intelligence officials on what are the security consequences such an unprecedented move. But even the head of the research division at the time, Brig.-Gen. Yossi Kuperwasser, heard about the disengagement for the first time only when it was already a done deal.
This happened during a meeting held by the prime minister's chief of staff, Attorney Dov Weissglass, who was Sharon's negotiator with the Palestinians. The decision was presented in that meeting as a done deal, and none of those in attendance - senior Shin Bet and IDF officials - were asked for their opinion on the topic.
The IDF was no more than an executing contractor, according to one of the generals who participated in the discussions about the Gaza disengagement. The top echelons of the army quickly got used to the fact their opinion did not interest anyone among the political leadership and that they hold no sway or influence on the decision. Army Intelligence and the Operations Directorate's analysis of what could happen on the Gaza front after the Israeli withdrawal focused mostly on the advantages of such a move.
If there were any who thought otherwise in the army, they kept quiet. Especially in public. The IDF's chief at the time, Moshe Ya'alon, whose term was cut short three months before the disengagement from Gaza, knew a little bit more than his generals. During one of the meetings he had with Sharon, shortly before his speech at the Herzliya Conference, the prime minister presented him with an idea he heard from minister Tommy Lapid.
In an attempt to create a diplomatic initiative and end the diplomatic freeze ahead of the implementation of the American road map for peace that was on the table at the time, Lapid proposed to evacuate three settlements in the Gaza Strip. Ya'alon could not have known that behind this "small plan" was a much bigger plan. Sharon, it seemed, just wanted to test the waters with the IDF chief. At the time, they talked about two or three Jewish settlements on the northern border of the Gaza Strip - Nisanit, Dugit and Elei Sinai.
Ya'alon rejected the idea out of hand. A withdrawal, he claimed, will encourage jihadist groups. Later, Ya'alon was quoted as saying that the disengagement from Gaza will provide a "tailwind" for terrorism, which did not make him any more popular in the Prime Minister's Office. Then-defense minister, Shaul Mofaz, supported the disengagement, but did not take part in the prime minister's intimate consultations with his close allies. Several days before the Herzliya Conference, Sharon updated Mofaz in a phone call about his intention to present the disengagement initiative at the conference. Sharon was really checking whether Mofaz would remain by his side during the move.
Cold shoulder from Ya'alon
A decade later, the memory of the "executing contractors" - the IDF chief of staff, army generals, Army Intelligence officials and others - is growing dim. But one thing is clearly remembered by all: The army was not a real partner in the decision-making process. What the political leadership was interested in, and this was the army's main role, was the physical evacuation of the settlements.
The IDF was not really asked to present to the political leadership with its assessments of the expected security situation in the area as a result of the disengagement, both on the medium and long-term. Now, these high-ranked officials maintain that Sharon did not include them in the decision-making process both because he was afraid of leaks, and because he was afraid of private and public opposition from the army, which could have sabotaged the evacuation plan.
The security cabinet itself was not a full partner in the decision-making process either. Sharon worked with several close advisors - which at the time were referred to as "The Ranch Forum" - and used to have private consultations with a very small group of people, among them some from the military. One of them was Brig.-Gen. Eival Gilady, then the head of the strategic planning division in the Planning Directorate. Weissglass also held meetings with army officials from the Planning Directorate and Army Intelligence. But near the end of 2004, chief of staff Ya'alon barred these officers from showing up to these meetings, because he considered them a manipulative political forum in which the army had no place.
The relations between Weissglass and the chief of staff were already murky and difficult by that point. While the PMO viewed Ya'alon as a "strange bird" who could only get in the way, the chief of staff's office suspected Weissglass was turning the prime minister against Ya'alon. Brig.-Gen. Gilady, who continued having direct communications with the prime minister, got the cold shoulder from Ya'alon.
After the Herzliya speech, in December 2003, defense minister Mofaz met with chief of staff Ya'alon on the evacuation plan. It was clear to both of them that evacuating three settlements was neither here nor there. The defense minister thought it made more sense to evacuate all of the Jewish settlements in Gaza.
At the time, the prime minister and defense minister received a "map of national security interests" prepared by the Planning Directorate during Yitzhak Rabin's premiership. According to this document, Israel's clear security interests were in the West Bank, and there was no room for negotiations there. In the Gaza Strip, however, the situation was reverse. In Gaza, there was no way to improve the security situation, because the IDF was not in control of the entire Strip, and there was only one division there to protect the settlers.
The working assumption was that as soon as the Gaza Strip is evacuated, not only could the army cut the number of troops in the area by a third, but the border itself will be calmer. Furthermore, the defense establishment asserted, an IDF pullout from the Strip will give Israel the freedom to hit Gaza harder if the Palestinian Authority fails to control the rebellious organizations in the Strip.
2004 was the first year in which the number of Israeli casualties in Gaza was higher than in the West Bank. Hundreds of Qassam rockets were fired from the Strip, half of which fell in Sderot. In addition, some 3,000 mortar shells were fired at Jewish settlements inside the Gaza Strip and communities on the border.
During a situation assessment, the IDF said that following the disengagement, Hamas will have an interest to maintain the calm in Gaza. Any escalation against Hamas, the IDF believed, will happen in the West Bank or inside Israel. The belief was that after the disengagement, Hamas would view the West Bank as its center of operations, and it will have no interest to drag the IDF back into the Gaza Strip.
It was enough for the IDF to defend the Gaza border properly for relative calm to be maintained. All of this, of course, depended on whether or not the evacuation would go ahead as planned. For a long time, the top echelons of the army believed nothing would come out of this plan. At first, the disengagement imitative was viewed as Sharon testing the waters. Later, the army believed the plan will not go ahead because of political reasons. Maybe that is why the IDF and Shin Bet did not feel any urgency, and did not see the need to discuss the long-term processes that would happen in Gaza after the IDF withdraws.
The heads of the IDF also don't remember ever being called to a cabinet meeting on what is expected to happen in Gaza the day after the withdrawal. It was only in February 2005, when the Disengagement Plan Implementation Law was passed in the Knesset, that the heads of the defense establishment realized there was no way back anymore. This was also when Ya'alon's replacement as IDF chief was announced: Dan Halutz.
In early February 2004, Haaretz journalist Yoel Marcus wrote about a conversation he had with Sharon in which the prime minister talked about a full disengagement from the Gaza Strip. After reading this article, chief of staff Ya'alon sent a letter to the prime minister, which was followed by a tense meeting between the two. Ya'alon complained that the army was not included, that there was no administrative work done, and that all of this was unacceptable. Sharon blew him off, and promised to have a meeting on the topic as soon as possible.
It happened two months later. Prime minister Sharon, defense minister Mofaz, chief of staff Ya'alon, Shin Bet chief Avi Dichter, Planning Directorate head Yitzhak Harel, Army Intelligence chief Aharon Ze'evi-Farkash and others were all present in the meeting. This was actually the first meeting in which the disengagement plan was formally presented and that included a discussion about the repercussions of this plan. Sharon informed those present that the evacuation of the Gaza Strip will be done within a year.
This was the first real fall out between Sharon and Ya'alon. The chief of staff claimed withdrawing from the Gaza Strip when Islamist groups were on the defensive internationally was a fatal error that could change this trend. Several weeks after that discussion, the defense minister and chief of staff received a document from GOC Southern Command Dan Harel titled "Hamastan in Gaza."
The document, which analyzed the security developments that are expected in the Gaza Strip following the disengagement, raised the possibility that Hamas would take over the Strip and that the disengagement would not lead to the long sought for calm. An argument broke out in the General Staff, and the Southern Command received response documents from Army Intelligence which rejected that thesis.
The Southern Command officers who wrote the document now admit that it did not include a clear prediction that Hamas would take over Gaza in a military campaign, and that the Strip will turn into a main center of fighting against Israel. The concept of "Hamastan" was included in the military discussion, but the document ended up becoming an episode that changed nothing. No one doubted the fact the Southern Command would execute any order it received.
During a government meeting in June 2004, the heads of Israel's intelligence community estimated that the move would improve the security situation in the south. Army Intelligence chief Ze'evi-Farkash said at that meeting that "The disengagement will decrease terrorism and make it bearable." Shin Bet chief Avi Dichter predicted the unilateral move "will lead to a decrease in the number terrorist attacks and change their pattern."
Another argument that arose later was whether to evacuate the Gaza Strip but leave IDF presence along the Philadelphi Route on the Egyptian border to strop smuggling, as well as leaving the northern border settlements Nisanit, Dugit and Elei Sinai. In both cases, it was decided to withdraw. The decision on the Philadelphi Route was made a day before the beginning of the evacuation in August 2005. Sharon was against it, but the legal advisers explained to him he could not announce a pullout from the Strip while remaining in Philadelphi.
Back then, even before the disengagement, Army Intelligence had information about tunnels that were being dug near IDF posts on the Gaza border. Military reporters were specifically told in briefings that this trend was growing and that there was digging in the direction of Hoover's Axis, which surrounds the Gaza Strip. Shortly before the disengagement, Israeli officials estimated there were over ten tunnels in front of Hoover's Axis. Less than a year after the disengagement, Gilad Shalit was kidnapped through one of these tunnels.
Work accident
The IDF completed the evacuation of the Gaza Strip on September 11, 2005. On September 23, Hamas held a "victory parade" at the Jabalia refugee camp, during which a Qassam rocket fell off a vehicle, blew up in the crowds and caused secondary explosions of ammunition and other weapons. Over 20 Palestinians were killed and dozens injured. Even though this was a work accident, Hamas blamed Israel and vowed revenge. That very night, less than a week after the end of the disengagement, a heavy barrage of rockets was fired at Sderot and the rocket fire did not stop for two days.
The IDF responded late, in what was code-named "Operation First Rain," and included mostly airstrikes. The government was criticized for avoiding a significant response. All of this did not make Israeli security officials, including the Shin Bet, change their situation assessment from the eve of the disengagement.
Two months after the end of the disengagement, in November 2005, G., the head of the Shin Bet's southern district, said in a private conversation that "so long as we encourage Abbas' rule, we don't perceive the smuggling of weapons into the Palestinian Authority as a threat ... the control over the Philadelphi Route collapsed when Israel withdrew, now the situation is stabilizing, even though there are incidents of bribes given to both Palestinian officers and to Egypt."
What bothered the Shin Bet at the time was terrorists leaving Gaza through the Sinai Peninsula to commit attacks in the Negev, and the concern the Palestinians move their terror activity from Gaza to the West Bank. That month, the incoming GOC Southern Command, Yoav Galant, told military reporters: "Israel's withdrawal from Gaza did not significantly change the balance of power inside the Gaza Strip.
The withdrawal from the Philadelphi Route created a situation of a less moderate border than Israel initially estimated. Hamas took 55 percent of the votes in municipal elections in the Gaza Strip and shocked Fatah. The belief is that Hamas will be included in the political system, but that this is a self-disciplined organization and the decision to take over the Strip is not one made by Hamas' military wing."
In February 2007, a year and a half after the disengagement, Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin spoke of the passing year. He spoke about the disintegration of the Palestinian Authority, mostly in Gaza, and about Fatah's war for survival, which he believed will motivate its people to fight. And then he also determined: "Hamas is interested in calm. For Hamas, a government is not the main thing. Hamas is incapable of governing."
He went on to say that "We don't have a proper response to the steep-trajectory rocket fire from the Gaza Strip. If it continues and there is no Palestinian group to stop it, Israel will be forced to go back into the Gaza Strip. At the moment, there's no room for Israel to intervene, as Fatah is still the dominant group against the fundamentalists and we shouldn't get in the way."
In February 2007, a year and a half after the disengagement, Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin spoke of the passing year. He spoke about the disintegration of the Palestinian Authority, mostly in Gaza, and about Fatah's war for survival, which he believed will motivate its people to fight. And then he also determined: "Hamas is interested in calm. For Hamas, a government is not the main thing. Hamas is incapable of governing."
He went on to say that "We don't have a proper response to the steep-trajectory rocket fire from the Gaza Strip. If it continues and there is no Palestinian group to stop it, Israel will be forced to go back into the Gaza Strip. At the moment, there's no room for Israel to intervene, as Fatah is still the dominant group against the fundamentalists and we shouldn't get in the way."
Even Sharon thought Israel should help Abbas take over Gaza, and he even met with him. In a briefing with reporters in February 2005, Sharon said: "I am not a diplomat, I'm a farmer, and I won't leave anything unclear. We need to help Abbas. I said I was ready to help him and I'm helping him. We helped him during Arafat's illness and burial and during the elections."
At the end of the day, the disengagement was a political-diplomatic move. Sharon was willing to take security risks and that is why the IDF was only included in the execution and not in the decision-making process. The top military echelons quickly toed the line and provided the political leadership with the "right" security reasoning. The authority Maj.-Gen. (res.) Sharon had in matters of security was crucial.
The inability of Israel's security forces to correctly assess the diplomatic and military developments that would occur in the Strip after the disengagement should not surprise anyone. Army Intelligence has a built-in handicap in their ability to predict major social or diplomatic processes. Army Intelligence could never replace the cabinet, prime minister and defense minister's experience and thinking process. On the eve of the disengagement, Army Intelligence was not required to provide – nor did it – any strategic warning on the possibility of a terror entity rising to power in Gaza.
Since the establishment of that Hamastan in Gaza, it forced a continuous unrest on Israel, international de-legitimization, enormous investment of money and resources, and, above all, four large-scale military operations. Hamas' military capabilities can reach north of the Tel Aviv area now, and the group continues growing stronger. Gaza has turned into a real front, which will occupy large IDF forces even during confrontations on other fronts, like Lebanon.
A year before the evacuation, the Southern Command warned of 'Hamastan in Gaza,' but Army Intelligence was quick to dismiss it, while the Shin Bet estimated Hamas was interested in calm; those who did try to alert of the dangers of leaving Gaza were pushed aside, while the rest toed the line.
The first time the GOC Southern Command, Dan Harel, heard about the plan to evacuate Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip was on the radio, while driving his car. This was in December 2003. He was listening to prime minister Ariel Sharon's speech at the Herzliya Conference when he suddenly realized that a dramatic decision has been made in secret and without his knowledge, and that one of the most meaningful events the Israeli society and the IDF will ever experience was going to happen under his command.
The research division at Army Intelligence, which was supposed to provide the intelligence for the Gaza disengagement, was also unaware of what was happening in the prime minister's close circle. It is not unreasonable to assume that the prime minister and defense minister would be interested in hearing the opinion of Army Intelligence officials on what are the security consequences such an unprecedented move. But even the head of the research division at the time, Brig.-Gen. Yossi Kuperwasser, heard about the disengagement for the first time only when it was already a done deal.
This happened during a meeting held by the prime minister's chief of staff, Attorney Dov Weissglass, who was Sharon's negotiator with the Palestinians. The decision was presented in that meeting as a done deal, and none of those in attendance - senior Shin Bet and IDF officials - were asked for their opinion on the topic.
The IDF was no more than an executing contractor, according to one of the generals who participated in the discussions about the Gaza disengagement. The top echelons of the army quickly got used to the fact their opinion did not interest anyone among the political leadership and that they hold no sway or influence on the decision. Army Intelligence and the Operations Directorate's analysis of what could happen on the Gaza front after the Israeli withdrawal focused mostly on the advantages of such a move.
If there were any who thought otherwise in the army, they kept quiet. Especially in public. The IDF's chief at the time, Moshe Ya'alon, whose term was cut short three months before the disengagement from Gaza, knew a little bit more than his generals. During one of the meetings he had with Sharon, shortly before his speech at the Herzliya Conference, the prime minister presented him with an idea he heard from minister Tommy Lapid.
In an attempt to create a diplomatic initiative and end the diplomatic freeze ahead of the implementation of the American road map for peace that was on the table at the time, Lapid proposed to evacuate three settlements in the Gaza Strip. Ya'alon could not have known that behind this "small plan" was a much bigger plan. Sharon, it seemed, just wanted to test the waters with the IDF chief. At the time, they talked about two or three Jewish settlements on the northern border of the Gaza Strip - Nisanit, Dugit and Elei Sinai.
Ya'alon rejected the idea out of hand. A withdrawal, he claimed, will encourage jihadist groups. Later, Ya'alon was quoted as saying that the disengagement from Gaza will provide a "tailwind" for terrorism, which did not make him any more popular in the Prime Minister's Office. Then-defense minister, Shaul Mofaz, supported the disengagement, but did not take part in the prime minister's intimate consultations with his close allies. Several days before the Herzliya Conference, Sharon updated Mofaz in a phone call about his intention to present the disengagement initiative at the conference. Sharon was really checking whether Mofaz would remain by his side during the move.
Cold shoulder from Ya'alon
A decade later, the memory of the "executing contractors" - the IDF chief of staff, army generals, Army Intelligence officials and others - is growing dim. But one thing is clearly remembered by all: The army was not a real partner in the decision-making process. What the political leadership was interested in, and this was the army's main role, was the physical evacuation of the settlements.
The IDF was not really asked to present to the political leadership with its assessments of the expected security situation in the area as a result of the disengagement, both on the medium and long-term. Now, these high-ranked officials maintain that Sharon did not include them in the decision-making process both because he was afraid of leaks, and because he was afraid of private and public opposition from the army, which could have sabotaged the evacuation plan.
The security cabinet itself was not a full partner in the decision-making process either. Sharon worked with several close advisors - which at the time were referred to as "The Ranch Forum" - and used to have private consultations with a very small group of people, among them some from the military. One of them was Brig.-Gen. Eival Gilady, then the head of the strategic planning division in the Planning Directorate. Weissglass also held meetings with army officials from the Planning Directorate and Army Intelligence. But near the end of 2004, chief of staff Ya'alon barred these officers from showing up to these meetings, because he considered them a manipulative political forum in which the army had no place.
The relations between Weissglass and the chief of staff were already murky and difficult by that point. While the PMO viewed Ya'alon as a "strange bird" who could only get in the way, the chief of staff's office suspected Weissglass was turning the prime minister against Ya'alon. Brig.-Gen. Gilady, who continued having direct communications with the prime minister, got the cold shoulder from Ya'alon.
After the Herzliya speech, in December 2003, defense minister Mofaz met with chief of staff Ya'alon on the evacuation plan. It was clear to both of them that evacuating three settlements was neither here nor there. The defense minister thought it made more sense to evacuate all of the Jewish settlements in Gaza.
At the time, the prime minister and defense minister received a "map of national security interests" prepared by the Planning Directorate during Yitzhak Rabin's premiership. According to this document, Israel's clear security interests were in the West Bank, and there was no room for negotiations there. In the Gaza Strip, however, the situation was reverse. In Gaza, there was no way to improve the security situation, because the IDF was not in control of the entire Strip, and there was only one division there to protect the settlers.
The working assumption was that as soon as the Gaza Strip is evacuated, not only could the army cut the number of troops in the area by a third, but the border itself will be calmer. Furthermore, the defense establishment asserted, an IDF pullout from the Strip will give Israel the freedom to hit Gaza harder if the Palestinian Authority fails to control the rebellious organizations in the Strip.
2004 was the first year in which the number of Israeli casualties in Gaza was higher than in the West Bank. Hundreds of Qassam rockets were fired from the Strip, half of which fell in Sderot. In addition, some 3,000 mortar shells were fired at Jewish settlements inside the Gaza Strip and communities on the border.
During a situation assessment, the IDF said that following the disengagement, Hamas will have an interest to maintain the calm in Gaza. Any escalation against Hamas, the IDF believed, will happen in the West Bank or inside Israel. The belief was that after the disengagement, Hamas would view the West Bank as its center of operations, and it will have no interest to drag the IDF back into the Gaza Strip.
It was enough for the IDF to defend the Gaza border properly for relative calm to be maintained. All of this, of course, depended on whether or not the evacuation would go ahead as planned. For a long time, the top echelons of the army believed nothing would come out of this plan. At first, the disengagement imitative was viewed as Sharon testing the waters. Later, the army believed the plan will not go ahead because of political reasons. Maybe that is why the IDF and Shin Bet did not feel any urgency, and did not see the need to discuss the long-term processes that would happen in Gaza after the IDF withdraws.
The heads of the IDF also don't remember ever being called to a cabinet meeting on what is expected to happen in Gaza the day after the withdrawal. It was only in February 2005, when the Disengagement Plan Implementation Law was passed in the Knesset, that the heads of the defense establishment realized there was no way back anymore. This was also when Ya'alon's replacement as IDF chief was announced: Dan Halutz.
In early February 2004, Haaretz journalist Yoel Marcus wrote about a conversation he had with Sharon in which the prime minister talked about a full disengagement from the Gaza Strip. After reading this article, chief of staff Ya'alon sent a letter to the prime minister, which was followed by a tense meeting between the two. Ya'alon complained that the army was not included, that there was no administrative work done, and that all of this was unacceptable. Sharon blew him off, and promised to have a meeting on the topic as soon as possible.
It happened two months later. Prime minister Sharon, defense minister Mofaz, chief of staff Ya'alon, Shin Bet chief Avi Dichter, Planning Directorate head Yitzhak Harel, Army Intelligence chief Aharon Ze'evi-Farkash and others were all present in the meeting. This was actually the first meeting in which the disengagement plan was formally presented and that included a discussion about the repercussions of this plan. Sharon informed those present that the evacuation of the Gaza Strip will be done within a year.
This was the first real fall out between Sharon and Ya'alon. The chief of staff claimed withdrawing from the Gaza Strip when Islamist groups were on the defensive internationally was a fatal error that could change this trend. Several weeks after that discussion, the defense minister and chief of staff received a document from GOC Southern Command Dan Harel titled "Hamastan in Gaza."
The document, which analyzed the security developments that are expected in the Gaza Strip following the disengagement, raised the possibility that Hamas would take over the Strip and that the disengagement would not lead to the long sought for calm. An argument broke out in the General Staff, and the Southern Command received response documents from Army Intelligence which rejected that thesis.
The Southern Command officers who wrote the document now admit that it did not include a clear prediction that Hamas would take over Gaza in a military campaign, and that the Strip will turn into a main center of fighting against Israel. The concept of "Hamastan" was included in the military discussion, but the document ended up becoming an episode that changed nothing. No one doubted the fact the Southern Command would execute any order it received.
During a government meeting in June 2004, the heads of Israel's intelligence community estimated that the move would improve the security situation in the south. Army Intelligence chief Ze'evi-Farkash said at that meeting that "The disengagement will decrease terrorism and make it bearable." Shin Bet chief Avi Dichter predicted the unilateral move "will lead to a decrease in the number terrorist attacks and change their pattern."
Another argument that arose later was whether to evacuate the Gaza Strip but leave IDF presence along the Philadelphi Route on the Egyptian border to strop smuggling, as well as leaving the northern border settlements Nisanit, Dugit and Elei Sinai. In both cases, it was decided to withdraw. The decision on the Philadelphi Route was made a day before the beginning of the evacuation in August 2005. Sharon was against it, but the legal advisers explained to him he could not announce a pullout from the Strip while remaining in Philadelphi.
Back then, even before the disengagement, Army Intelligence had information about tunnels that were being dug near IDF posts on the Gaza border. Military reporters were specifically told in briefings that this trend was growing and that there was digging in the direction of Hoover's Axis, which surrounds the Gaza Strip. Shortly before the disengagement, Israeli officials estimated there were over ten tunnels in front of Hoover's Axis. Less than a year after the disengagement, Gilad Shalit was kidnapped through one of these tunnels.
Work accident
The IDF completed the evacuation of the Gaza Strip on September 11, 2005. On September 23, Hamas held a "victory parade" at the Jabalia refugee camp, during which a Qassam rocket fell off a vehicle, blew up in the crowds and caused secondary explosions of ammunition and other weapons. Over 20 Palestinians were killed and dozens injured. Even though this was a work accident, Hamas blamed Israel and vowed revenge. That very night, less than a week after the end of the disengagement, a heavy barrage of rockets was fired at Sderot and the rocket fire did not stop for two days.
The IDF responded late, in what was code-named "Operation First Rain," and included mostly airstrikes. The government was criticized for avoiding a significant response. All of this did not make Israeli security officials, including the Shin Bet, change their situation assessment from the eve of the disengagement.
Two months after the end of the disengagement, in November 2005, G., the head of the Shin Bet's southern district, said in a private conversation that "so long as we encourage Abbas' rule, we don't perceive the smuggling of weapons into the Palestinian Authority as a threat ... the control over the Philadelphi Route collapsed when Israel withdrew, now the situation is stabilizing, even though there are incidents of bribes given to both Palestinian officers and to Egypt."
What bothered the Shin Bet at the time was terrorists leaving Gaza through the Sinai Peninsula to commit attacks in the Negev, and the concern the Palestinians move their terror activity from Gaza to the West Bank. That month, the incoming GOC Southern Command, Yoav Galant, told military reporters: "Israel's withdrawal from Gaza did not significantly change the balance of power inside the Gaza Strip.
The withdrawal from the Philadelphi Route created a situation of a less moderate border than Israel initially estimated. Hamas took 55 percent of the votes in municipal elections in the Gaza Strip and shocked Fatah. The belief is that Hamas will be included in the political system, but that this is a self-disciplined organization and the decision to take over the Strip is not one made by Hamas' military wing."
In February 2007, a year and a half after the disengagement, Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin spoke of the passing year. He spoke about the disintegration of the Palestinian Authority, mostly in Gaza, and about Fatah's war for survival, which he believed will motivate its people to fight. And then he also determined: "Hamas is interested in calm. For Hamas, a government is not the main thing. Hamas is incapable of governing."
He went on to say that "We don't have a proper response to the steep-trajectory rocket fire from the Gaza Strip. If it continues and there is no Palestinian group to stop it, Israel will be forced to go back into the Gaza Strip. At the moment, there's no room for Israel to intervene, as Fatah is still the dominant group against the fundamentalists and we shouldn't get in the way."
In February 2007, a year and a half after the disengagement, Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin spoke of the passing year. He spoke about the disintegration of the Palestinian Authority, mostly in Gaza, and about Fatah's war for survival, which he believed will motivate its people to fight. And then he also determined: "Hamas is interested in calm. For Hamas, a government is not the main thing. Hamas is incapable of governing."
He went on to say that "We don't have a proper response to the steep-trajectory rocket fire from the Gaza Strip. If it continues and there is no Palestinian group to stop it, Israel will be forced to go back into the Gaza Strip. At the moment, there's no room for Israel to intervene, as Fatah is still the dominant group against the fundamentalists and we shouldn't get in the way."
Even Sharon thought Israel should help Abbas take over Gaza, and he even met with him. In a briefing with reporters in February 2005, Sharon said: "I am not a diplomat, I'm a farmer, and I won't leave anything unclear. We need to help Abbas. I said I was ready to help him and I'm helping him. We helped him during Arafat's illness and burial and during the elections."
At the end of the day, the disengagement was a political-diplomatic move. Sharon was willing to take security risks and that is why the IDF was only included in the execution and not in the decision-making process. The top military echelons quickly toed the line and provided the political leadership with the "right" security reasoning. The authority Maj.-Gen. (res.) Sharon had in matters of security was crucial.
The inability of Israel's security forces to correctly assess the diplomatic and military developments that would occur in the Strip after the disengagement should not surprise anyone. Army Intelligence has a built-in handicap in their ability to predict major social or diplomatic processes. Army Intelligence could never replace the cabinet, prime minister and defense minister's experience and thinking process. On the eve of the disengagement, Army Intelligence was not required to provide – nor did it – any strategic warning on the possibility of a terror entity rising to power in Gaza.
Since the establishment of that Hamastan in Gaza, it forced a continuous unrest on Israel, international de-legitimization, enormous investment of money and resources, and, above all, four large-scale military operations. Hamas' military capabilities can reach north of the Tel Aviv area now, and the group continues growing stronger. Gaza has turned into a real front, which will occupy large IDF forces even during confrontations on other fronts, like Lebanon.
26 june 2015
UN General-Secretary Ban Ki-Moon is said to be following the case of the Freedom Flotilla III closely, and he believes that sending the fleet 'will not help to address the dire situation in Gaza'
The Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon called on the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to translate his words into action regarding his commitment to a two-state solution.
The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, said in a speech before the Security Council on Wednesday, that the secretary-general welcomes Netanyahu's commitment to a two-state solution, but he emphasises the need to translate words into action, and accordingly, to halt the Israeli settlement plans in the West Bank.
Feltman said that Ban has requested Israel, in the framework of strengthening trust, secure the "the legitimate movement of people and goods in and between Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem."
He noted that the situation of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails is worrying, adding that the Israeli draft resolution aimed at force feeding detainees on hunger strike, if passed, could be "in contravention of international standards."
Last Sunday, the Israeli government approved, on a preliminary basis, a bill which authorises prison administrations to force feed prisoners on hunger strike, according to local Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth.
Regarding Freedom Flotilla III, Feltman said that Ban is following the case closely, and he believes that sending the fleet "will not help to address the dire situation in Gaza." But he reiterated his calls on the Israeli government to lift the blockade that has been imposed on Gaza since 2007.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon called on the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to translate his words into action regarding his commitment to a two-state solution.
The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, said in a speech before the Security Council on Wednesday, that the secretary-general welcomes Netanyahu's commitment to a two-state solution, but he emphasises the need to translate words into action, and accordingly, to halt the Israeli settlement plans in the West Bank.
Feltman said that Ban has requested Israel, in the framework of strengthening trust, secure the "the legitimate movement of people and goods in and between Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem."
He noted that the situation of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails is worrying, adding that the Israeli draft resolution aimed at force feeding detainees on hunger strike, if passed, could be "in contravention of international standards."
Last Sunday, the Israeli government approved, on a preliminary basis, a bill which authorises prison administrations to force feed prisoners on hunger strike, according to local Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth.
Regarding Freedom Flotilla III, Feltman said that Ban is following the case closely, and he believes that sending the fleet "will not help to address the dire situation in Gaza." But he reiterated his calls on the Israeli government to lift the blockade that has been imposed on Gaza since 2007.
25 june 2015
Research shows that Ethiopian Israelis have less education on average than other Jewish Israelis and have lower quality jobs with less pay; while the situation is better for the younger generation, major gaps remain.
Around half of women and 17 percent of men among employed Ethiopian immigrants who moved to Israel after the age of 12 work in cleaning and cooking, according to a new study by the Taub Center for Social Policy Research in Israel. In comparison, around 3.5 percent of non-Ethiopian Jewish men and women are employed in these jobs.
The study was based on Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) figures from 1998-2013, but researchers believe that the situation has not changed since then. The study did point to an improvement in the rate of education and employment for young Israelis of Ethiopian origin compared to the previous generation, but the road to equality is still long, the researchers found.
According to the CBS, the gross income of an Ethiopian immigrant household in 2013 was NIS 11,453 a month – about 35 percent less than the average income for the general population, which stood at NIS 17,711 per household. According to the study's researchers, Hadas Fuchs and Gilad Brand, this gap might be explained by disparities in education, type of employment, and salaries.
The study was based on Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) figures from 1998-2013, but researchers believe that the situation has not changed since then. The study did point to an improvement in the rate of education and employment for young Israelis of Ethiopian origin compared to the previous generation, but the road to equality is still long, the researchers found.
According to the CBS, the gross income of an Ethiopian immigrant household in 2013 was NIS 11,453 a month – about 35 percent less than the average income for the general population, which stood at NIS 17,711 per household. According to the study's researchers, Hadas Fuchs and Gilad Brand, this gap might be explained by disparities in education, type of employment, and salaries.
Gaps in education are narrowing, but are far from disappearing. Fuchs and Brand found that the rate of Bagrut certificates (the Israeli matriculation certificate required to complete high school) among students of Ethiopian origin who were born in Israel or immigrated at a young age stood at 53 percent, compared to 75 percent of Jews who are not of Ethiopian origin.
The study found a similar trend in the world of higher education. Among Israelis of Ethiopian origin educated in Israel, 20 percent have an academic degree – around half of the rate among the general Jewish population. Among those who came from Ethiopia after the age of 12, the rate is only six percent, and out of this group, most of those holding a degree are people who arrived in Israel before the age of 18.
A more encouraging finding is the improvement in high-school education compared to the previous generation. Thirty six percent of Israelis of Ethiopian origin who came to Israel at an older age completed high school, while the rate among those who were educated in Israel is around 90 percent – similar to the general Jewish population.
The study showed a marked increase in the employment rate among Ethiopian women, but most hold low-wage positions.
The employment rate among Ethiopian immigrants aged 25-54 rose significantly over the course of a decade, stabilizing in 2009-2011 at around 72 percent – a figure only slightly lower than the employment rate among the general Jewish population, which is about 79 percent.
The increase was evident for both genders, but was particularly striking among women: While only about 35 percent of Ethiopian women were employed in 1998-2000, compared to nearly 65 percent in 2009-2011.
The study noted that much like education, employment among those who were educated in Israel is greater than among those who immigrated at an older age. But these younger Ethiopians' employment still lags behind the general Jewish population in certain respects. About one fifth of Ethiopians educated in Israel are employed in the upper tiers of the job market, around half the proportion among the general Jewish population.
Researchers further found that a relatively high proportion of Ethiopians who moved to Israel at older ages work in cleaning and cooking, although the study noted that this finding was specific to workers who arrived at the age of 13 and older.
Among Ethiopian immigrants who were educated in Israel, the rate of employment in cleaning jobs is similar to the general Jewish population – 3.9 percent.
Around half of women and 17 percent of men among employed Ethiopian immigrants who moved to Israel after the age of 12 work in cleaning and cooking, according to a new study by the Taub Center for Social Policy Research in Israel. In comparison, around 3.5 percent of non-Ethiopian Jewish men and women are employed in these jobs.
The study was based on Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) figures from 1998-2013, but researchers believe that the situation has not changed since then. The study did point to an improvement in the rate of education and employment for young Israelis of Ethiopian origin compared to the previous generation, but the road to equality is still long, the researchers found.
According to the CBS, the gross income of an Ethiopian immigrant household in 2013 was NIS 11,453 a month – about 35 percent less than the average income for the general population, which stood at NIS 17,711 per household. According to the study's researchers, Hadas Fuchs and Gilad Brand, this gap might be explained by disparities in education, type of employment, and salaries.
The study was based on Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) figures from 1998-2013, but researchers believe that the situation has not changed since then. The study did point to an improvement in the rate of education and employment for young Israelis of Ethiopian origin compared to the previous generation, but the road to equality is still long, the researchers found.
According to the CBS, the gross income of an Ethiopian immigrant household in 2013 was NIS 11,453 a month – about 35 percent less than the average income for the general population, which stood at NIS 17,711 per household. According to the study's researchers, Hadas Fuchs and Gilad Brand, this gap might be explained by disparities in education, type of employment, and salaries.
Gaps in education are narrowing, but are far from disappearing. Fuchs and Brand found that the rate of Bagrut certificates (the Israeli matriculation certificate required to complete high school) among students of Ethiopian origin who were born in Israel or immigrated at a young age stood at 53 percent, compared to 75 percent of Jews who are not of Ethiopian origin.
The study found a similar trend in the world of higher education. Among Israelis of Ethiopian origin educated in Israel, 20 percent have an academic degree – around half of the rate among the general Jewish population. Among those who came from Ethiopia after the age of 12, the rate is only six percent, and out of this group, most of those holding a degree are people who arrived in Israel before the age of 18.
A more encouraging finding is the improvement in high-school education compared to the previous generation. Thirty six percent of Israelis of Ethiopian origin who came to Israel at an older age completed high school, while the rate among those who were educated in Israel is around 90 percent – similar to the general Jewish population.
The study showed a marked increase in the employment rate among Ethiopian women, but most hold low-wage positions.
The employment rate among Ethiopian immigrants aged 25-54 rose significantly over the course of a decade, stabilizing in 2009-2011 at around 72 percent – a figure only slightly lower than the employment rate among the general Jewish population, which is about 79 percent.
The increase was evident for both genders, but was particularly striking among women: While only about 35 percent of Ethiopian women were employed in 1998-2000, compared to nearly 65 percent in 2009-2011.
The study noted that much like education, employment among those who were educated in Israel is greater than among those who immigrated at an older age. But these younger Ethiopians' employment still lags behind the general Jewish population in certain respects. About one fifth of Ethiopians educated in Israel are employed in the upper tiers of the job market, around half the proportion among the general Jewish population.
Researchers further found that a relatively high proportion of Ethiopians who moved to Israel at older ages work in cleaning and cooking, although the study noted that this finding was specific to workers who arrived at the age of 13 and older.
Among Ethiopian immigrants who were educated in Israel, the rate of employment in cleaning jobs is similar to the general Jewish population – 3.9 percent.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Israel dropped by nearly 50% in 2014 compared to 2013, a report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) found out.
The report tracks a sharp decrease in percentages of foreign investments in Israel. In 2014 $6.4 billion were invested in Israel, whereas in 2013 $11.8 billion were invested - a decline of about 46%.
Moreover, Israeli FDI investments abroad also decreased from $4.67 billion in 2013 to $3.97 billion, a decrease of 15%. These figures are significantly lower than the corresponding figures from 2007 to 2005, before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008.
"We believe that what led to the drop in investment in Israel are Operation Protective Edge [in reference to Israel’s military aggression on blockaded Gaza] and the boycotts Israel is facing,"
Roni Manos of the College of Management and one of the authors of the report's summary told Ynet. According to Manos, there is another reason for the decline.
"In the past there were large transactions such as Waze and ISCAR Metalworking which boosted investment, but over the past year there were not enough such deals."
According to the UN report, world FDI investments during the past year amounted to only $1.23 trillion, a 16% drop compared to 2013 ($1.47 trillion dollars).
The main reason for this, according to the report's authors, is weak global economic growth and uncertainty regarding economic and business policy in many countries, which deterred many investors. Among others, the uncertainty due to the rate of quantitative easing in the US and Europe, the Greek debt crisis and its impact on stability in the Eurozone, and the pace of economic growth in China.
Other factors influencing the decline in global FDI were geopolitical risks such as the conflict in Ukraine, which has calmed down in recent months, the worsening of relations between the West and Russia, and revolutions and regime changes in several countries in the Middle East.
The report tracks a sharp decrease in percentages of foreign investments in Israel. In 2014 $6.4 billion were invested in Israel, whereas in 2013 $11.8 billion were invested - a decline of about 46%.
Moreover, Israeli FDI investments abroad also decreased from $4.67 billion in 2013 to $3.97 billion, a decrease of 15%. These figures are significantly lower than the corresponding figures from 2007 to 2005, before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008.
"We believe that what led to the drop in investment in Israel are Operation Protective Edge [in reference to Israel’s military aggression on blockaded Gaza] and the boycotts Israel is facing,"
Roni Manos of the College of Management and one of the authors of the report's summary told Ynet. According to Manos, there is another reason for the decline.
"In the past there were large transactions such as Waze and ISCAR Metalworking which boosted investment, but over the past year there were not enough such deals."
According to the UN report, world FDI investments during the past year amounted to only $1.23 trillion, a 16% drop compared to 2013 ($1.47 trillion dollars).
The main reason for this, according to the report's authors, is weak global economic growth and uncertainty regarding economic and business policy in many countries, which deterred many investors. Among others, the uncertainty due to the rate of quantitative easing in the US and Europe, the Greek debt crisis and its impact on stability in the Eurozone, and the pace of economic growth in China.
Other factors influencing the decline in global FDI were geopolitical risks such as the conflict in Ukraine, which has calmed down in recent months, the worsening of relations between the West and Russia, and revolutions and regime changes in several countries in the Middle East.
